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A growing consensus in social cognitive neuroscience holds that large portions of the
primate visual brain are dedicated to the processing of social information, i.e., to those
aspects of stimuli that are usually encountered in social interactions such as others’
facial expressions, actions, and symbols. Yet, studies of social perception have mostly
employed simple pictorial representations of conspecifics. These stimuli are social only in
the restricted sense that they physically resemble objects with which the observer would
typically interact. In an equally important sense, however, these stimuli might be regarded
as “non-social”: the observer knows that they are viewing pictures and might therefore
not attribute current mental states to the stimuli or might do so in a qualitatively different
way than in a real social interaction. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance
of such higher-order conceptualization of the stimulus for social perceptual processing.
Here, we assess the similarity between the various types of stimuli used in the laboratory
and object classes encountered in real social interactions. We distinguish two different
levels at which experimental stimuli can match social stimuli as encountered in everyday
social settings: (1) the extent to which a stimulus’ physical properties resemble those
typically encountered in social interactions and (2) the higher-level conceptualization of the
stimulus as indicating another person’s mental states. We illustrate the significance of
this distinction for social perception research and report new empirical evidence further
highlighting the importance of mental state attribution for perceptual processing. Finally,
we discuss the potential of this approach to inform studies of clinical conditions such as
autism.
Keywords: social perception, social neuroscience, interaction, gaze perception, face perception, mental state
attribution, theory of mind, autism
INTRODUCTION
Extensive networks within the primate visual system seem to
be dedicated to the perceptual processing of social stimuli. For
instance, classical electrophysiological work in macaques has
identified distinct cell populations in inferior-temporal cortex
that are specifically tuned to faces (Perrett et al., 1992; Tsao
et al., 2006) and studies in humans using psychophysical and
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques have
revealed dedicated mechanisms that process another person’s
facial expressions (Adolphs, 2002), their gaze-direction (Jenkins
et al., 2006; Calder et al., 2007, 2008), or their facial identity
(Webster and Macleod, 2011). Each of these studies provides core
examples of what many researchers refer to as “social perception.”
At first glance, this label seems obvious: the term social percep-
tion denotes those perceptual and sensory-motor processes that
are tuned to and elicited by classes of objects encountered in social
interactions. However, aside from this (trivially) obvious answer,
the question of what the specific nature of stimuli is that elicits
neural mechanisms of social information processing has so far not
been adequately answered. In fact, studies in areas such as social
perception, social cognition, or social cognitive neuroscience, that
specifically focus on aspects of information processing that are
supposedly dedicated to the social have faced the difficulty of
defining their topic of research (e.g., Adolphs, 2010) and are vul-
nerable to criticisms that deny the existence of such dedicated
mechanisms (e.g., Fernandez-Duque and Baird, 2005).
Here, rather than focusing our attention directly on previous
empirical or philosophical contributions to this topic, we address
a related, more specific and more tractable question, exploring
the extent to which experimental stimuli typically used in the lab-
oratory resemble social stimuli as they are encountered in the real
world. We argue that it is important to distinguish at least two
broad levels of resemblance: namely, the level of physical stimulus
properties and the level of how the observer conceptualizes the
stimulus in terms of mental states. We argue that this analysis has
important implications for the types of questions different exper-
imental designs are able to address. Second, we provide new data
that illustrate the importance of distinguishing between the dif-
ferent levels in order to tease apart the various processes involved
in social perception. Finally, we discuss the implications of this
framework for social perception research with a specific focus on
clinically relevant work.
As a point of departure, let us consider an observer’s expe-
rience in a typical social perception experiment. They sit in
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a dark room performing a repetitive, pared-down task, press-
ing buttons in response to monochromatic, cropped images of
socially-relevant stimulus features such as another’s angry facial
expressions, each presented on a monitor for a few hundred mil-
liseconds. This type of experiment conventionally serves as a
working model of human perception of others’ angry faces in
everyday viewing. However, with such a constrained set of stim-
uli, it can of course do so only to a limited degree. To illustrate,
consider, by way of contrast with the imagined experiment, a
heated exchange with a boss, colleague, or partner, in which you
assessed the escalation of the situation in part by closely observ-
ing their increasingly angry facial expressions. Some aspects are
shared between the two scenarios, and looking at a picture of an
angry face presented on a screen likely recruits some the same per-
ceptual mechanisms that viewing the angry face of a person live
does. In both instances the observer has to perform a discrim-
ination on the basis of subtle differences in canonical stimulus
configurations. However, in a different sense the two scenarios
bear little relation to one another.
First, there are clear physical differences between the stim-
uli: in everyday viewing, facial expressions dynamically change,
they are embedded within the rich context of another’s bodily
actions and speech prosody, and cues from multiple information
sources often indicate the same dimension of interest. These dif-
ferences do need addressing—and partly have been started to be
addressed—in social cognitive neuroscience, but they are not our
key focus here. For the purposes of this analysis, we shall leave
aside the clear physical differences between the stimuli. Rather,
we address those differences that are not directly and locally
stimulus-bound. In particular, the observer’s knowledge that the
other person is physically present likely engages perception in fun-
damentally different ways to the simple observation of a picture
or movie in an experiment. It is these latter differences that make
experimental “social” stimuli such as picture of a face in some
important sense “non-social” as we will discuss in more detail
below.
Social perception research has largely avoided tackling the
difficult challenge of describing the different ways in which exper-
imental stimuli can resemble real social stimuli. Yet, if its goal is
to understand the perceptual information processes taking place
when people interact with others rather than when they look at
briefly presented pictures of other people, confronting this issue
can no longer be postponed. Given the drastic differences in stim-
ulus properties and in the deeper social dimension between most
stimuli used in the laboratory and those existing in the real world,
the assumption that the former directly correspond to any subset
of the latter might be invalid. Simple images are undoubtedly a
useful tool in face and body perception research, identifying those
parts of the human visual system tuned to perceptual process-
ing of socially-relevant stimulus features. However, experiments
employing such stimuli address only certain aspects of what the
visual system is faced with in everyday life and can at best pro-
vide a frame of reference from which to study real-world social
interactions. It therefore seems crucial to develop a framework
that allows for the evaluation of the types of perceptual informa-
tion processing that can be studied with different types of stimuli.
As a starting point for the development of such a framework, we
believe that it is heuristically useful to distinguish between at least
two different levels at which social stimuli can be conceptualized.
These levels are linked by complex dependencies and interac-
tions, and are directly related to different levels of information
processing.
At the most fundamental level, other people are physical
objects and information processing mechanisms should apply to
their external spatiotemporal features in similar ways as to inan-
imate objects. Moreover, some social stimuli are distinguished
from other object classes by specific canonical spatiotemporal
configurations and may be processed in a manner accorded only
to such social stimuli. Prime examples are faces or biological
motion. These stimuli are social in the sense that we typically
encounter their spatiotemporal properties only in social interac-
tions. Translating this to the laboratory, at this level, experimental
stimuli such as a picture of a face are conceptualized as “social”
due their physical stimulus features, that resemble those with
which an observer would typically interact. With certain caveats,
pictures, animations, or videos are appropriate stimuli for studies
interested in social perception at this level.
However, on a second level, stimuli as encountered in real
social interactions differ fundamentally from those typically used
in the laboratory by the fact that they are indicators of other peo-
ples’ mental states. Another person’s smile is not just a change in
the configuration of the spatiotemporal properties of the stimu-
lus but indicates a deeper underlying social dimension, namely,
the other’s mental or emotional state. The use of such perceptual
properties to attribute mental states to others is termed theory
of mind (ToM; Adolphs, 2009; Apperly, 2011). Conventionally,
studies address how social stimuli trigger ToM processes in a
bottom–up manner (Frith and Frith, 2003; Nummenmaa and
Calder, 2009) However, a pervasive problem for the interpreta-
tion of many of these studies arises from the fact that almost
all of these experiments employ pictures, static animations or,
at best, videos of faces and people as stimuli. Such stimuli are
appropriate for testing social perception at the level of percep-
tual stimulus properties, but the degree to which they can trigger
other socio-cognitive processes involved in real-life interactions is
unclear. Whereas static pictures may often trigger some cognitive
processes similar to ToM, there are obvious problems involved in
equating looking at a picture or video with looking at a real per-
son. When watching Tom Cruise on TV, the stimulus does not
elicit embarrassment because a celebrity is present and you are
sitting in your living room in your pajamas. As an observer you
know and in some sense perceive that pictures and animations
presented in an experiment, or even filmed actors, are, currently,
objects that cannot see, feel or think. When using such stim-
uli in the laboratory, it is important to realize that they differ
substantially from social stimuli encountered in everyday social
interactions and represent, at best, ambiguous targets for mental-
state attribution. This notion is supported by a small, but growing
number of studies, some of which are reviewed below, that indi-
cate that looking at a real person or at a stimulus the observer
believes to be a real person can trigger qualitatively different
information processing than observing pictures, animations, and
videos of other people (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b; Teufel et al.,
2009, 2010a,b; Pönkänen et al., 2011; Moore et al., in press).
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A related difficulty in interpreting social perception studies
arises from the fact that many experimental designs confound the
two levels in a more subtle way. To illustrate, at a mental-state
level, a person with open eyes can see and a person with closed
eyes cannot. Human observers tend to interpret such stimuli
purely in terms of the underlying mental states. Logically, how-
ever, equating open and closed eyes with the ability or inability
to see is confounding the mental state itself with its possible, but
not necessary, external manifestation. For instance, a blind per-
son with open eyes cannot see, a person can smile without being
happy, or cry without being sad; the observer’s knowledge of the
observed individual may serve to disambiguate these percepts.
Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the mental state from
the observable behavior that communicates it, not only logically,
but also empirically in experiments. Conventional studies, using
images or movies in limited semantic contexts, cannot do so. In
other words, when using such stimuli to study social perception it
is impossible to determine whether the perceptual differences or
the different mental states indicated by the perceptual differences
are responsible for differential processing.
We recently developed a novel experimental paradigm that
has the potential to disentangle the two levels described above.
This approach has been successfully employed to study gaze-
and action-perception as well as closely related sensory-motor
processes such as automatic gaze-following (Teufel et al., 2009,
2010a,b; Moore et al., in press). To illustrate this methodology,
let us consider a study that applied this approach to study gaze-
adaptation. Following extended exposure to a stimulus, many
neural mechanisms coding the properties of that stimulus become
less responsive. This adaptation biases the responses of popu-
lations of neurons recruited to perceive subsequently presented
stimuli, and thereby leads to specific and measurable distortions
of perception (Frisby, 1979; Webster, 2011). These “aftereffects”
of adaptation can thus be used to probe the representational and
functional structure underlying perception. Importantly, they are
not only seen in relation to low-level visual properties such as ori-
entation and direction of movement but also in high-level social
perception of faces and facial gestures (Thompson and Burr,
2009; Webster and Macleod, 2011).
In the gaze-adaptation paradigm developed by Calder and
colleagues (Jenkins et al., 2006; Calder et al., 2008), observers
are exposed to pictures of faces gazing in a specific direction.
Subsequent to this adaptation, the observers’ perception of other
people’s gaze direction is biased toward the opposite side. In
other words, adaptation to leftward gazing faces leads to a sub-
sequent bias in gaze-perception to the right and adaptation to
rightward gaze leads to a subsequent leftward bias. These gaze-
direction aftereffects indicate the existence of distinct populations
of neurons in the human brain that are specifically tuned to
different gaze-directions. Moreover, a recent study combining
adaptation and fMRI localized these neurons in the human STS
(Calder et al., 2007), lending support to the notion that the pro-
cesses demonstrated with the gaze-adaptation paradigm are akin
to those shown in single-unit recordings employed in macaques
(Perrett et al., 1992).
In order to disentangle a purported role of ToM in
gaze-perception from contributions of lower-level perceptual
processes, we recently modified this paradigm in various ways
(Teufel et al., 2009). First, the static pictures of previous stud-
ies were exchanged for short video clips of two people; one was
used as the adaptor (i.e., the stimulus to which the observer
adapted) who was looking either to the right or left, and the sec-
ond person was used as the test stimulus. An elaborate deception
procedure convinced observers that these clips showed real peo-
ple on-line via a live camera-link to an adjoining room similar
to video conferencing. Moreover, the specific mental states that
observers attributed to the person used as the adaptor stimu-
lus were directly manipulated by the use of two pairs of goggles.
The lenses of these goggles were highly mirrored and therefore
appeared identical from the perspective of an onlooker. From the
perspective of the person wearing them, however, one was trans-
parent so that the person could see and the other was opaque,
thus blindfolding the wearer (Novey, 1975; Heyes, 1998). Prior
to the experiment, observers experienced these visual properties
for themselves, so that when they saw another person wearing
them, one pair signaled that the other could see and the sec-
ond pair signaled that the other could not see. Observers were
adapted to short video clips of a person looking in a specific direc-
tion, believing that this pre-recorded video showed—via a live
camera-link to the next room—a real person who was either able
or unable to see. Gaze-direction aftereffects were subsequently
measured by the observer’s bias in perceiving another person’s
eye-orientation. Note that across observers, bottom–up sensory
input was identical between conditions in this design; the only
aspect that changed was the observer’s belief of the adaptor’s abil-
ity to see. The results of this study effectively reduce to two basic
findings. First, significant aftereffects were found in both condi-
tions. Second, aftereffects were significantly larger when observers
believed that the person they adapted to was able to see than when
they believed this personwas unable to see through their (opaque)
goggles.
According to our analysis in the previous sections, the stimuli
used in this experiment resemble social stimuli as encountered
in a real social interaction in two different ways: first, the stimu-
lus configuration of a face looking to the left or right resembles
perceptual properties as encountered in everyday social settings
and should trigger information processing of mechanisms tuned
to these properties. Second, independent of perceptual prop-
erties, the stimulus has a deeper social dimension in that the
observer has beliefs regarding the other’s ability to see or not
see. We hypothesize that the two different aspects of the results
map onto these different stimulus levels and the respective types
of information processing. Recall that adaptation effects were
found in both conditions. We argue that the first finding is
a result of processes in the visual system that are specifically
tuned to the perceptual properties of another person’s gaze direc-
tion (Jenkins and Langton, 2003; Calder et al., 2007, 2008). In
addition to these processes, which are most likely shared with
nonhuman primates and possibly other social mammals, humans
possess an information processing system that prioritizes per-
ceptual information on the basis of its social relevance. This is
reflected in the modulatory effects that mental-state attribution
exerted on gaze-processing. Note that only the use of an inno-
vative procedure such as the one we employed allowed us to
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demonstrate the difference between these two types of informa-
tion processing.
In order to further support our hypothesis regarding the
importance of appropriate stimulus qualities to tease apart the
various levels of information processing in social perception,
we conducted an experiment with a procedure identical to
the previous study except that we informed observers about
the fact that they watched videos rather than convincing them
that they watched a real person. They were asked to keep in
mind that at the time of filming the videos, the person they
adapted to was either able or unable to see dependent on the
glasses they were wearing. Based on the assumption that social
information processing at the level of stimulus properties is
indifferent to the high-level conceptualization of the percep-
tual situation the observer is faced with, we predicted that
gaze-direction aftereffects should be seen in both conditions.
Furthermore, if information processing at the level of mental-
state attribution is sensitive to whether the observer believes
they are watching a video or a real person, by contrast to our
previous study, we expected the adaptation effects not to be
modulated by the condition. Comparing the current findings
to a re-analysis of our previous findings, we should find a sig-
nificant interaction between the two experiments and the two
conditions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The materials and methods used in this study were identical to
those in Experiment 2 of a previous study conducted by the
authors (Teufel et al., 2009) except for two aspects. First, in the
current study, no deception procedure was employed; observers
thus knew they watched videos rather than believing they inter-
acted with a real person. Second, two novel experimenters ran the
experiments.
OBSERVERS
Fifty-six healthy observers with normal or corrected-to-normal
vision completed the experiment. Observers were between 18 and
25 years old; the sample was roughly balanced with respect to gen-
der. Given that we did not intend to analyse effects of age and
gender, more specific information was not retained. Observers
gave written consent, received payment and were fully debriefed
after completion of the experiment. The study was approved by
the local ethics committee.
APPARATUS AND MATERIALS
As described in more detail in a previous paper (Teufel et al.,
2009), we used two different pairs of goggles. One pair, either
with a blue or yellow frame, was transparent from the perspective
of the person wearing the goggles so that they could see through
the goggles; the second pair, with a blue or yellow frame color
to distinguish it from the first pair, was completely opaque, thus
blindfolding the wearer. Both pairs had highly mirrored lenses
that appeared identical from the perspective of an onlooker, simi-
lar to highly mirrored sunglasses. Observers received first-person
experience of the translucent or light-blocking properties of these
goggles prior to the experiment. When they saw another person
wearing the goggles, one pair therefore, signaled that the other
could see and the other pair indicated that the other person was
not able to see.
STIMULI
The stimuli used in this experiment are described in more detail
in a previous paper (Teufel et al., 2009). All video images sub-
tended 20◦ horizontally by 16.2◦ vertically of visual angle and
were presented in the center of a Sony Trinitron Multiscan E530
screen using an Apple Mac Mini Computer running PsyScope-
X software. By contrast to our previous study, interstimulus and
intertrial intervals just showed a blank screen with a fixation cross.
The video-sequences used as adaptation and top–up adap-
tation stimuli showed a head and shoulders view of a male
adaptation model, wearing mirrored goggles and with the head
rotated 25◦ to the left or right with the shoulders in frontal view
(Figure 1). Each adaptation and top–up adaptation stimulus con-
sisted of a new video sequence. Most clips were highly similar but
on a few the adaptation model moved in a specific way (cheek
scratching, coughing etc.).
The test stimuli consisted of a head and shoulders view of a
male model with the head pointing straight ahead and the eyes
averted 5◦ to the left, straight or 5◦ to the right (Figure 1). We
used 10 different videos of each of the different gaze-directions
and the same 30 stimuli were used in all sessions. All test stimuli
were highly similar.
PROCEDURE
Each observer participated in two conditions: A “Seeing” condi-
tion, in which the adaptation model wore the goggles that the
observer had previously experienced as transparent and a “Non-
Seeing” condition, in which the adaptor wore the opaque goggles.
The order of conditions and the color of the goggles were coun-
terbalanced across observers. Within each condition, we used a
paradigm with an adaptation phase prior to a post-adaptation
acuity phase. Each adaptation phase consisted of 24 trials in which
the adaptation videos were shown in random order. Each clip was
presented for 4000ms with a blank screen for 1000ms between
clips (Figure 1). The observers were instructed to attend to the
person on the screen and to keep in mind that, at the time of
shooting the videos, the person was or was not able to see depend-
ing on the goggles they were wearing. As in our previous study,
no further clarifications as to what the person in the videos was
looking at were given. On half of the adaptation trials an asterisk
appeared 400ms after the start of the video in one of 12 differ-
ent locations distributed over the eye region of the adaptor’s face
for 200ms. Observers were instructed to press the space-bar as
quickly as possible in response to the appearance of this asterisk.
Response time measurements allowed us to estimate the amount
of attention allocated to the face shown in the videos in the Seeing
compared to the Non-Seeing condition. In total, each observer
participated in four adaptation phases: one adaptation phase in
which the adaptation model on the screen was turned to the left
and one in which they were turned to the right in both the Seeing
and the Non-Seeing condition.
A post-adaptation acuity test directly followed each adapta-
tion phase. Each trial comprised of a top–up adaptation video
in which the adaptation model was shown turned in the same
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FIGURE 1 | A schematic illustration of the experimental procedure
(ITI—intertrial interval; ISI—interstimulus interval). The experiment
consisted of an adaptation phase and a post-adaptation test. During the
adaptation phase, which consisted of repeated presentations of an
adaptation stimulus, observers were adapted to a specific gaze-direction
(as indicated by head-orientation). This adaptation block was then followed
by a post-adaptation test, in which observers’ gaze-perception was
measured. Each post-adaptation test trial consisted of a test stimulus
gazing to the left, straight ahead, or to the right, preceded by a top–up
adaptation stimulus.
direction and wearing the same goggles as during the previ-
ous adaptation phase, followed by an interstimulus interval (ISI;
500ms) and by a test stimulus (showing the test model facing
straight on and gazing either 5◦ to the left, straight ahead or 5◦
to the right; Figure 1). Chosen randomly, 10 trials were left tri-
als, 10 were straight trials and the remaining 10 were right trials.
The observers were instructed to indicate the gaze-direction, left,
direct, or right by pressing the respective buttons 1, 2, or 3 on the
keyboard.
A training phase prior to the first adaptation phase in both
conditions was used to ensure that participants were able to
perceive the different gaze-directions shown in the test stimuli.
This phase was identical to the post-adaptation acuity without
the presentation of any top–up adaptation stimuli. Similar to
our previous study, we excluded three observers whose perfor-
mance was more than two standard deviations below the group
in the training session (less than 54% correct), assuming that
this low performance indicated general problems in judging gaze-
direction. Average acuity rates and standard deviation of the
remaining 53 observers in the two training sessions were 83%
(range± 12%). Further details of the experimental procedure can
be found in (Teufel et al., 2009).
ANALYSIS
Following Teufel et al. (2009), we calculated an overall adaptation
score by assigning a 1 to left-responses, 0 to straight-responses
and −1 to right-responses. These scores were summed within
the test phase of each condition (separately for Seeing and Non-
Seeing conditions and for adaptation to leftward gaze vs. right-
ward gaze), yielding a measure of mean gaze-direction judgment.
The greater the tendency to perceive gaze-direction as right-
ward, the more negative this overall bias score was, and the more
gaze was perceived as leftward, the more positive it was. These
composite scores were analysed using a 2 × 2 repeated-measures
ANOVA with factors of Condition (Seeing or Non-Seeing) and
Adaptation Side (Left and Right). A note of caution in inter-
preting these results was necessary in that the residuals violated
normality assumptions (Shapiro-Wilks Tests p < 0.05). Although
we were confident that our large effective sample size meant
that the analysis should be robust to them, we conducted a
non-parametric equivalent to this analysis by directly calculating
aftereffects separately for Seeing and Non-Seeing Conditions—
achieved by subtracting the composite score for the Right from
the Left adaptation condition in each case. These aftereffects were
then compared for Seeing vs. Non-Seeing conditions using a
Wilcoxon test.
To set this result in context, we planned to re-analyse data
from our previous study (Teufel et al., 2009) and directly compare
those aftereffects to the ones calculated for the current study. We
were specifically interested in comparing the modulatory effect
of mental-state attribution on gaze-direction aftereffects when
participants believed they were viewing a “live” person with cur-
rent mental states (our previous study) vs. when they knew they
were watching videos (the current study). Given that there was a
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considerable difference in sample size between the two studies (16
vs. 56) that would exacerbate the effects of amarginally significant
violation of homogeneity of variance (Levene’s test: p < 0.05 for
both Seeing and Non-Seeing levels of the factor Condition) and
the non-normality of the resulting residuals (Shapiro Wilks tests
p < 0.05), it was obvious that a mixed-ANOVA design might not
be reliable. Accordingly, for that analysis, we subtracted the after-
effects for the Non-Seeing condition from those of the Seeing
condition to serve as an index of the influence of Condition
(Seeing vs. Non-Seeing) on the effects of adaptation: positive
scores would indicate larger effects of adaptation in the Seeing
than the Non-Seeing condition as had previously been found
(Teufel et al., 2009). We performed this calculation on the scores
for the current study and the previous study and then compared
them using a Mann-Whitney U-test.
RESULTS
Mean gaze-direction aftereffects are plotted in Figure 2, sepa-
rately for the current study (left panel) and our previous study
(right panel; Teufel et al., 2009). As is clear from viewing the
figure, there were robust gaze-direction aftereffects in the cur-
rent experiment that seemed not to be modulated by the con-
dition. A repeated-measures ANOVA [Condition (Seeing vs.
Non-Seeing) × Adaptation-Side (Left vs. Right)] confirmed this
impression: there was a significant main effect of Adaptation-Side
[F(1, 52) = 50.19, p < 0.001] but no main effect of Condition
[F(1, 52) = 1.45, n.s.] and no Condition × Adaptation-Side inter-
action [F(1, 52) = 1.69, n.s.]. However, as described above, the
residuals from that analysis were not normally distributed and
transformations did not resolve this problem. Accordingly, we
FIGURE 2 | Gaze-direction aftereffects in the Seeing and Non-Seeing
condition. The left panel shows the results of the current study (without
deception); in the panel on the right, results from the second experiment of
our previous study (with deception; Teufel et al., 2009) are re-plotted for
comparison purposes. Aftereffects were calculated by subtracting the
judgment scores for the rightward adaptation from the leftward adaptation
conditions. Larger gaze-direction aftereffects indicate a larger difference in
the influence of adaptation on subsequent gaze-direction perception
between the rightward vs. the leftward adaptation conditions.
subtracted scores in leftward adaptation from rightward adapta-
tion scores in each condition to provide an index of aftereffect
magnitude and compared these in the Seeing vs. Non-Seeing con-
ditions using a Wilcoxon test; this yielded a virtually identical
result to the ANOVA, bolstering our conclusions from that first
analysis (Z = –1.3, p = 0.19). The RT data did not differ signif-
icantly in the two conditions (380ms vs. 369ms for Seeing and
Non-Seeing conditions, respectively, t(52) = 1.793, p > 0.05).
When we compared the magnitude of the adaptation effects
in each condition to the data from Teufel et al. (2009) a different
pattern of results emerges in the two studies. Statistical analysis
of these data indicated that the condition (Seeing vs. Non-Seeing)
had a significantly different influence on gaze-adaptation in the
two studies (U = 280, p < 0.05). Indeed, the evidence from the
current sample was that, by contrast to our previous experiments,
condition had no effect on gaze-adaptation. The differences in
RT between the Seeing and the Non-Seeing conditions was not
significantly different in the two experiments (U = 363, n.s.).
DISCUSSION
In the current article, we put forward a framework that addresses
the extent to which stimuli employed in conventional social per-
ception experiments address the crucial dimensions observers
encounter in social interactions in the real world. We argue that,
at the most basic level, it is important to distinguish between (1)
the spatiotemporal properties that set apart certain social stimuli
such as faces or biological motion from other object classes, and
(2) the deeper social dimension that is characteristic of stimuli
in real-life social interaction because they indicate other people’s
mental states. Moreover, we support this account with empiri-
cal data from an experiment in which we employed a modified
version of the gaze-adaptation paradigm (Teufel et al., 2009). In
combination with our previous findings, the results of this exper-
iment indicate that whereas conventional stimuli can be used
to study the functional organization of those parts of the visual
system that are particularly tuned to socially-relevant spatiotem-
poral stimulus characteristics, they are not well-suited to address
processes in social perception that are sensitive to higher-level
conceptualizations of those stimuli in terms of the underlying
mental states. We demonstrate aftereffects in gaze perception after
extended exposure to a specific gaze direction, indicating adap-
tation of specific populations of neurons tuned to the adaptor’s
direction of gaze. Yet, despite using identical stimuli as a previous
study (Teufel et al., 2009) we found no indication of a modu-
latory effect on gaze-direction aftereffects by attributed mental
states. This is most likely due to the fact that observers knew
they were watching videos of other people rather than believing
that they interacted with a real person as in our previous study.
In the remainder of this article, we discuss these findings as well
as potential implications of our framework for social perception
research more generally.
On the one hand, the finding that no modulatory effects of
mental-state attribution were evident when observers knew they
were watching videos ties in nicely with previous findings. To
our knowledge, there are no other studies that directly scrutinize
the role of (believed) presence or absence of another person for
ToM processes in social perception similar to the current study.
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However, a couple of other researchers have demonstrated the
importance of the believed or actual presence of another per-
son in perceptual processing of faces (Pönkänen et al., 2011) or
another person’s actions (Wohlschläger et al., 2003a,b). These
studies indicate that different information processing mecha-
nisms are recruited when observers believe the stimulus they see
is a real person that is present at the time of viewing compared
to when they believe that they are watching a representation of
an absent other. The findings of the current study, in combina-
tion with our previous results (Teufel et al., 2009), might provide
an explanation of why online presence has an effect on social
perception. In particular, we hypothesize that actual or believed
online presence of another person heightens the tendency of
observers to attribute mental states to the viewed stimuli. Mental-
state attribution might in turn have top–down effects to prioritise
the perceptual processing of specific socially-relevant information
(Teufel et al., 2010b).
Whereas this proposal might gain some plausibility from the
current literature, it is important to note that there are studies
that have demonstrated differential effects of ToM-like processes
on perception and associated sensory-motor responses when
static pictures or animations were employed (e.g., Stanley et al.,
2007; Liepelt et al., 2008; Nuku and Bekkering, 2008; Longo and
Bertenthal, 2009; Wiese et al., 2012). We use the term “ToM-like”
in this context because, as we have argued in the introduction,
observers know that pictures, videos, and animations do not have
mental states and these stimuli are, at best, ambiguous targets for
mental-state attribution. For instance, in a gaze-cueing paradigm,
Wiese et al. (2012) presented pictures of a human or a robot to
observers and, by means of instruction, manipulated the extent
to which observers believed the pictures represented a human
gazing to the left or right, a humanoid-looking puppet, a robot
whose gaze-behavior was controlled by a human, or a computer-
controlled robot. Gaze-following, the tendency of observers to
attend to locations looked at by others, was found to be larger
in the human and human-controlled robot conditions than the
puppet and the computer-controlled robot conditions, consistent
with the idea that observers’ high-level conceptualization of the
stimuli as intentional agents determined gaze-following behavior
independent of visual properties.
This finding is in stark contrast to the results reported in the
current study. Whereas we did not find a modulatory influence
on gaze perception by ToM in response to videos of real people,
Wiese et al. (2012) found such effects in response to pictures in
gaze-following, a behavioral response closely associated with gaze
perception (Teufel et al., 2010b). A possible explanation for this
puzzling pattern of findings is that there is a gradient of the extent
to which ToMprocesses are recruited by different types of stimuli.
In other words, observers might attribute similar mental states to
pictures of people as to live people, yet these attributions might be
inherently volatile and inconsistent across individuals. From this
perspective, the use of interactions with live people as stimuli or of
elaborate deception procedures to create this impression simply
serves to increase the tendency of observers to attribute mental
states and to exert some control over this process.
This possibility highlights one of the caveats of the compari-
son between the current study and our previous study. In both
studies, the Seeing and the Non-Seeing conditions differed only
in the observers’ belief about the stimuli and instructions given
prior to the experiment thus provide the main tool of manipula-
tion. The experimenter’s ability to communicate adequately and
to “convince” observers to adopt the desired conceptualization
of the task is therefore a key variable in determining the results.
The comparison of the current results with those of our previ-
ous study therefore has to be viewed in light of the fact that these
studies were conducted by different experimenters. Whereas this
is a potential confound of the comparison, it is reassuring in this
context that the two experiments reported in our previous study
(Teufel et al., 2009) were conducted by different experimenters
and resulted in similar findings, and that in the current study, two
experimenters each tested half of the observers and found identi-
cal results. In any case, given the importance of the instructions
and the experimenter in this kind of paradigm, it will be neces-
sary in the future to find a way of objectively quantifying how
successfully the instructions lead the observer to adopt the desired
conceptualization of the stimuli.
There is an alternative, non-mutually exclusive way to rec-
oncile studies that suggest that the online presence of another
person has an important influence on perceptual processing with
those studies that suggest that ToM-like processes can be trig-
gered even by pictorial representations. The ability to engage in
ToM requires a diverse collection of different socio-cognitive pro-
cesses (Frith and Frith, 1999, 2003; Adolphs, 2009; Apperly and
Butterfill, 2009) and it is thus possible that viewing a real per-
son or a picture of a real person might tap into different types or
aspects of mental-state attribution. A prime candidate for what
might render the online presence of another person so important
is the potential for direct engagement and interaction. Whereas
an observer might attribute mental states to a movie character
or even to a static picture of another person, such stimuli do
not provide the potential for interaction (see also Laidlaw et al.,
2011). This account is in line with a more recent development in
social cognitive neuroscience that emphasizes interaction as the
crucial and much neglected variable in social information pro-
cessing (Schilbach et al., 2006; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Bohl and
van den Bos, 2012). It will be important to assess the extent to
which mental-state attribution has differential effects on visual
processing depending on whether the observer directly engages
or has the potential to engage with the stimulus in comparison to
when they adopt a detached third-person perspective of the other.
At present, we know little about the importance of this factor, but
a fully-developed framework of the different levels of social stim-
uli will have to incorporate this variable in the future; this research
topic would surely benefit from a more detailed taxonomy of the
different aspects of mental state attribution in question.
Methodologically, this point emphasizes the inherent tension
between ecological validity and experimental control in social
perception research. Most current research tools of social per-
ception are borrowed from other areas of vision research and
psychophysics. For good reasons, many of these designs have
withstood the test of time and should be part of the toolkit of
every researcher in social perception. However, we argue that
social perception is special in that certain stimulus dimensions
cannot easily be incorporated in standard paradigms. In other
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words, while standard designs using simple pictures as stim-
uli might provide accurate internal validity, the extent to which
they approximate what the visual system is faced with in a real
social interaction might be very limited. In fact, a similar point
has recently been brought forward by Kingstone and colleagues
regarding the ecological (in) validity of much of vision research
more generally (Kingstone, 2009). We believe that the current
challenge in social perception is to develop new paradigms with
high ecological validity that do not sacrifice full experimental
control.
The previous point is of particular interest when consider-
ing implications for clinical studies. Autism Spectrum Conditions
(ASC) are a group of neurodevelopmental conditions where dif-
ficulties in social interaction and communication are defining
characteristics. Despite being well-studied, the literature on social
deficits in ASC shows many inconsistencies (e.g., Nation and
Penny, 2008; Falck-Ytter and Von Hofsten, 2011). For instance,
although individuals with ASC display difficulties in using infor-
mation from another person’s eye region to guide their social
behavior and show a striking tendency to avoid the eyes in social
interactions, this atypical gaze behavior is only inconsistently
observed in a laboratory setting when viewing images or videos
of faces or social scenes (Falck-Ytter and Von Hofsten, 2011). In
fact, individuals with ASC tend to show normal performance on
at least some typical social perception tasks involving eye gaze
such as discrimination of gaze-direction (Baron-Cohen, 1995)
and reflexive orienting to gaze cues (at least in some studies; see
Nation and Penny, 2008 for review).
A hypothesis that could contribute to an explanation of
the apparent inconsistencies between laboratory findings and
real-world observations might be derived from our proposed
framework. The visual system of autistic individuals might
show, at least in part, normal mechanisms tuned to the specific
spatiotemporal characteristics of socially-relevant stimuli. It is
this property that conventional social perception paradigms with
pictures, animations, or videos tap into and, given the assump-
tion, it therefore is no surprise that no differences between
patients and controls are found. Yet, due to a dysfunction
in implicit top–down modulation of perceptual processing by
mental-state attribution, autistic individuals might process these
signals in a fundamentally different manner with respect to the
deeper social dimension, and this might account for many of
the difficulties seen in everyday interactions. A fundamental chal-
lenge therefore remains the development of new paradigms which
more closely resemble real social situations in order to begin
to address these issues. In the field of autism research, the case
to do so is particularly compelling but progress has been slow
in adopting more ecologically valid stimuli. Recent develop-
ments offer a tantalizing glimpse of the types of questions that
may be asked of clinical disorders such as autism in the future
(Redcay et al., in press).
In conclusion, we propose a framework in social perception
research that highlights different ways in which experimental
stimuli can match the crucial dimensions of social stimuli as
encountered in real social interactions. In particular, we distin-
guish between the spatiotemporal characteristics of a stimulus
and the deeper social dimension the stimulus has in terms of its
potential to indicate another person’s mental states. This frame-
work has important implications for experimental design and
clinically-relevant work. To date, the number of studies speak-
ing to this issue is limited and provides a fascinating but puzzling
mosaic.
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